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Theories of embodied cognition propose that sensorimotor information is simulated
during language processing (e.g., Barsalou, 1999). Previous studies have demonstrated
that differences in simulation can have implications for word processing; for instance,
lexical processing is facilitated for verbs that have relatively more embodied meanings
(e.g., Sidhu et al., 2014). Here we examined the effects of these differences on memory
for verbs. We observed higher rates of recognition (Experiments 1a-2a) and recall
accuracy (Experiments 2b-3b) for verbs with a greater amount of associated bodily
information (i.e., an embodiment effect). We also examined how this interacted with the
imagined enactment effect: a memory benefit for actions that one imagines performing
(e.g., Ditman et al., 2010). We found that these two effects did not interact (Experiment
3b), suggesting that the memory benefits of automatic simulation (i.e., the embodiment
effect) and deliberate simulation (i.e., the imagined enactment effect) are distinct. These
results provide evidence for the role of simulation in language processing, and its effects
on memory.
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INTRODUCTION
Embodied cognition is a broad proposal for cognitive science that has taken several different forms
(e.g., Barsalou, 2008; Wilson and Golonka, 2013; Glenberg, 2015). A core feature of the embodied
cognition proposal is that sensorimotor experience is involved in a variety of cognitive processes.
Importantly, sensorimotor experience can play a role in cognition even in the absence of external
stimuli or movements, in the form of internal simulations of these experiences (Barsalou, 1999,
2008). According to Barsalou’s (1999) Perceptual Symbol Systems theory, sensory experiences of
a particular concept become organized and stored as a simulator. For instance, one’s experiences
viewing a car from multiple angles, hearing a car’s engine, feeling a car’s vibration, pressing the
gas pedal, are all stored as part of the concept car, as perceptual symbols. Then, one can simulate a
car, drawing on some combination of its constituent perceptual symbols to recreate the perceptual
experience of a car. Studies have demonstrated that perceiving an object automatically elicits a
simulation of interacting with it (e.g., Tucker and Ellis, 1998), and that seeing an action elicits a
simulation of performing that action (e.g., Buccino et al., 2001). These simulations are similar to
the actions themselves and involve similar brain areas (Gallese, 2007).
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These sensorimotor simulations can also be evoked during
the processing of language stimuli. This is consistent with the
proposal that information gained through sensorimotor or bodily
experience is important to the representation of word meaning,
and that retrieving a word’s meaning involves a simulation of
that experience (e.g., Barsalou, 1999). Stanfield and Zwaan (2001)
demonstrated that participants were faster to verify that an
object had been mentioned in a previous sentence if its visual
appearance matched what was implied by the sentence (e.g.,
faster to respond to an open umbrella if the sentence mentioned it
being used during a storm). This suggests that readers create vivid
simulations of a text’s visual features. Similarly, Glenberg and
Kaschak (2002) found that participants were faster to perform
either a push or a pull movement, if it was congruent with the
action described in a sentence (i.e., the action compatibility effect;
cf. Papesh, 2015). This suggests that individuals also simulate
the actions implied by a text. A neuroimaging study by Hauk
et al. (2004) supported this notion, and demonstrated that this
applies even when words are presented in isolation. They found
that reading action words performed with the face, arm, or leg
activated areas of the motor cortex responsible for moving those
parts of the body.
A potential implication of these findings is that variations
in the amount of simulation elicited by a word may lead to
differences in processing (for a review, see Connell and Lynott,
2015). Indeed, studies have found differences in reaction time
and accuracy when responding to words referring to objects
that are more or less easy to interact with (i.e., the BOI effect;
Siakaluk et al., 2008). This is consistent with sensorimotor
simulation playing a role in word processing. Processing benefits
for words eliciting a greater amount of simulation are consistent
with theories of semantic richness and the notion that “more
is better” (Balota et al., 1991, p. 214). Semantic richness is
a multidimensional construct that quantifies the amount of
meaning information associated with a given word (for a review,
see Pexman, 2012). In general, words that are more semantically
rich enjoy processing benefits on a variety of lexical tasks (e.g.,
Pexman et al., 2008; Yap et al., 2011). This is believed to be due to
stronger semantic activation for semantically rich items.
While much of the research on semantic richness effects
has examined noun stimuli, Sidhu et al. (2014) studied the
implications of embodied semantic richness for verb processing.
Verbs vary in the extent to which their meaning involves the
human body: for instance, the human body is crucial to the
meaning of the wordmove, but it has little to do with themeaning
of the word prove. Sidhu et al. (2014) quantified these differences
in relative embodiment by asking participants to rate the extent
to which the meaning of each of nearly 700 verbs involved the
human body. The authors found processing advantages for high
embodiment verbs on a lexical decision task, a picture-naming
task, and a syntactic categorization task. These findings were
consistent with the notion that high embodiment verbs elicit
a greater amount of simulation, and thus are processed faster
as a result of this type of semantic richness. The purpose of
the present study was to further examine potential differences
in simulation between high and low embodiment verbs, by
examining their implications for memory.
A basic principle in thememory literature is that differences in
elaboration during encoding have consequences for latermemory
(Lockhart and Craik, 1990). That is, items encoded with richer or
more extensive processing will be remembered better at a later
time. Importantly, some studies have shown that features of the
items themselves can lead to more or less elaborate encoding.
For example, Hargreaves et al. (2012) found evidence that words
with a greater number of semantic features were remembered
better on a free recall task. This was interpreted as evidence that
variations in the amount of information associated with an item
can lead to variations in elaboration during encoding.
Several previous studies have examined differences inmemory
based on variations in the amount of motor information
associated with a word. Madan and Singhal (2012) examined
recall memory for words referring to objects that were highly
manipulable (e.g., camera) as compared to those that were
not (e.g., table). The authors also varied encoding instructions
by asking participants to make a decision based on: their
personal experience with the object, the manipulability of
the object, or the number of letters in the word. Overall,
participants were better able to remember the names of
highly manipulable objects, though this pattern was reversed in
participants who were explicitly asked about the manipulability
of the objects. The authors interpreted the overall benefit for
highly manipulable items as being due to automatic activation of
motor representations. That is, the differences inmotor processes
activated by highly manipulable and non-manipulable objects
may have led to a memory benefit for the former. This is
consistent with the notion that differences in simulation can have
consequences for memory. Notably, in the Madan and Singhal
study, when participants deliberately processed items’ motor
features, this “automatic memory enhancing effect” of motor
simulation (p. 1568) was superseded, suggesting that automatic
simulation can be modulated by more deliberate processes.
Relatedly, a study by Montefinese et al. (2013) examined
the relationship between verb embodiment and memory. They
examined recognition memory for manipulatory verbs (i.e.,
verbs referring to actions performed with the hands; e.g., sew)
as compared to non-manipulatory verbs (e.g., sleep). Results
indicated that participants were more likely to categorize
manipulatory verbs as previously seen, both for old and new
items. Thus, both hit rates and false alarm rates were higher
for manipulatory verbs. The authors’ interpretation was that the
similarity in evoked motor information between old and new
manipulatory verbs may have led to more false remembering for
new manipulatory verbs. Thus, these results also suggest that the
simulation elicited by items during encoding can have effects on
memory; however, those effects may not always be facilitory.
Other evidence for the role of simulation in memory has
come from studies that have manipulated encoding conditions
to vary the amount of motor information that participants evoke
during encoding. The enactment effect is the finding is that
individuals often have a better memory for action-noun phrases
(e.g., roll the ball) that they themselves act out during encoding,
as opposed to those that they watch someone else perform, or
simply read about (Engelkamp and Krumnacker, 1980; Cohen,
1981). One explanation for this finding is that the additional
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motor information evoked as a result of pantomiming an action
facilitates encoding and retrieval (Engelkamp, 1998; Nilsson,
2000). Another potential explanation is that preparing to perform
an action necessitates more extensive processing of the action
(Helstrup, 1986).
Interestingly, enactment effects have also been observed for
imagined actions: differences inmemory emerge when imagining
oneself performing an action as compared to imagining someone
else performing an action (Engelkamp et al., 1989; Denis et al.,
1991). We will refer to these instances of the enactment effect, in
which self-performed actions are imagined as opposed to overtly
performed, as the “imagined enactment effect.” A version of this
was recently investigated by Ditman et al. (2010), who presented
participants with scenarios describing actions phrased in the first
person (e.g., I am rolling the ball), the second person (e.g., you
are rolling the ball) or the third person (e.g., he/she is rolling
the ball). Previous research has demonstrated that readers will
simulate a scene from different points of view depending on the
pronoun used (Brunyé et al., 2009). As such, the authors expected
better memory for the actions described in the second person
scenarios (because reading: you are rolling the ball, should elicit
a simulation of the self performing the action, from the reader’s
point of view) as compared to those in the first or third person.
This was because second person scenarios should evoke a greater
amount ofmotor information. This was borne out in their results,
with higher d’ scores (discriminability in recognition memory)
for actions in the second person scenarios.
In the current study, we first examined the effect of variations
in relative embodiment on memory (Experiments 1a and 1b).
Our hypothesis was that the greater amount of simulation
elicited by high embodiment verbs would lead to more elaborate
encoding for those items, and thus better memory. Notably,
embodiment was defined here in terms of the entire body (as
in Sidhu et al., 2014), as opposed to previous studies that have
examined verbs referring to actions performed with particular
body parts (e.g., the hands in Montefinese et al., 2013). Second,
to further explore the nature of this effect, we examined the joint
effects of embodiment and imagined enactment, investigating
whether verb embodiment would interact with the imagined
enactment effect when participants were instructed to create
mental simulations of the studied actions (Experiments 2a–3b).
The results of previous studies (e.g., Madan and Singhal, 2012)
have been taken to suggest that the memory benefit for items
with more associated motor information is due to automatic
simulation. If the embodiment effect is due to automatic
simulation, then it may be distinct from the more deliberate,
episodic simulation evoked in the imagined enactment effect,
and imagined enactment and embodiment should thus have
independent effects in our memory tasks. On the other hand,
if embodiment effects and imagined enactment effects have the
same source (some kind of generic simulation that is tapped by
both embodiment and enactment) then we expected that they
would interact in our memory tasks.
EXPERIMENT 1
We examined recognition memory for verbs that were high
and low in rated embodiment, in experiments run online
(Experiment 1a) and in the laboratory (Experiment 1b).
Experiment 1a
Method
Participants
This and subsequent studies were carried out in accordance
with the University of Calgary Ethics Committee, with written
informed consent from all subjects. All subjects gave written
informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Participants were 56 undergraduate students (52 female;M age=
20.52, SD = 3.83) at the University of Calgary who participated
for bonus credit in a Psychology course. All participants in
this and the following experiments had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision, and reported English proficiency. The University
of Calgary Conjoint Faculties Research Ethics Board approved
the experiments described here.
Stimuli and Procedure
Stimuli were 140 verbs selected from the embodiment norms
collected by Sidhu et al. (2014). These verbs were separated into
two lists of 70 items, each containing 35 verbs rated high in
embodiment (i.e., a rating > 3.5 on a seven point scale) and
35 verbs rated low in embodiment (i.e., a rating < 3.5). Within
each list, verbs high and low in embodiment were matched in
terms of length, log transformed HAL word frequency, number
of morphemes (Balota et al., 2007), orthographic Levenshtein
distance (Yarkoni et al., 2008), imageability (Chiarello et al.,
1999), and age of acquisition (Kuperman et al., 2012); they did,
TABLE 1 | Mean values (standard deviations in parentheses) of lexical and semantic variables for high and low embodiment verbs, Experiments 1a and 1b.
High embodiment verbs Low embodiment verbs t p Cohen’s d
Length 5.71 (1.39) 5.77 (1.23) 0.26 0.80 0.05
Log HAL frequency 8.08 (1.78) 8.31 (1.58) 0.79 0.43 0.14
Number of morphemes 1.44 (0.56) 1.43 (0.55) 0.15 0.88 0.02
OLD 1.97 (0.41) 2.00 (0.41) 0.46 0.65 0.07
Imageability 409.13 (61.56) 393.43 (64.40) 1.47 0.14 0.25
AoA 8.43 (2.27) 8.86 (2.16) 1.16 0.25 0.19
Embodiment 4.37 (0.48) 2.79 (0.26) 24.25 <0.001 4.27
OLD, Orthographic Levenshtein distance; AoA, Age of Acquisition.
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however, differ in terms of their rated embodiment (Sidhu et al.,
2014), see Table 1. Across lists, high and low embodiment verbs
were also matched on all of these variables. See Appendix A for
a full list of verb stimuli. The stimuli also included 70 nouns that
were matched to both lists of verbs on these variables (except for
relative embodiment).
Participants took part in Experiment 1a online, through the
research tool Qualtrics. During the study phase, participants saw
one list of 70 verbs, and the list of 70 nouns, one item at a
time, with items intermixed in a random order. Their task was
to make a response via mouse-click every time they saw a verb,
but to withhold a response if they saw a noun. We used this
encoding task to ensure that participants processed the meaning
of the verbs. Regardless of whether or not participants made a
response, a blank screen replaced each item after 5000 ms. This
blank screen was shown for 1000 ms, after which the next trial
began. Verbs were presented in their base form (e.g., run).
Following the study phase, participants were asked to solve
as many addition problems as they could in 5 min, after which
they took part in an unexpected recognition test. During this test,
participants saw both lists of 70 verbs (i.e., the list of verbs that
they had previously seen, and the list of verbs that they hadn’t
seen), one item at a time, intermixed in a random order. They
indicated whether they thought each verb was old or new via
mouse-click.
Results
We used paired-samples t-tests to examine if recognition
memory performance differed for high and low embodiment
verbs. Results indicated that the hit rate was significantly higher
for high embodiment verbs (M = 64.90, SD = 18.78) than for
low embodiment verbs (M = 61.12, SD = 18.69), t(55) = 2.43,
p = 0.02, Cohen’s d = 0.33 (see Figure 1A). There was no
significant difference between these verbs in false alarm rates, t(55)
= 1.62, p = 0.11; or d’ score, t(55) = 0.76, p = 0.45. Finally, we
investigated if participants set a different response criterion C for
each type of verb, using the following equation: C=−0.5× (zHit
Rate + zFalse Alarm Rate) (Macmillan and Creelman, 1991).
This revealed that participants set a significantly lower response
criterion C for high embodiment verbs (M = 0.13, SD = 0.44)
than for low embodiment verbs (M = 0.22, SD = 0.40), t(55) =
3.18, p= 0.002, Cohen’s d = 0.43. See Table 2.
Discussion
Participants were more likely to identify a verb as having been
previously studied if it was high in embodiment. This may
suggest that high embodiment verbs, and the simulations they
elicit, prompt more elaborative encoding. Participants also set a
significantly lower response criterion for high embodiment verbs,
which may suggest that participants are sensitive to the amount
TABLE 2 | Mean scores (standard deviations in parentheses) on memory
measures for high and low embodiment verbs, in Experiments 1a and 1b.
Memory measure High embodiment verbs Low embodiment verbs
EXPERIMENT 1A
% Hits 64.90 (18.78) 61.12 (18.69)
% FAs 27.04 (15.19) 24.90 (12.62)
d’ Score 1.09 (0.55) 1.04 (0.60)
Criterion C 0.13 (0.44) 0.22 (0.40)
EXPERIMENT 1B
% Hits 75.03 (10.24) 69.56 (12.59)
% FA 28.81 (14.31) 30.19 (14.02)
d’ Score 1.32 (0.51) 1.12 (0.52)
Criterion C −0.05 (0.31) 0.00 (0.32)
FIGURE 1 | Mean percentage of high and low embodiment items correctly identified as old (i.e., hits), in Experiment 1a (A) and 1b (B). Error bars
represent 95% CIs using the Cousineau (2005) correction.
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of simulation evoked by an item, and that this may affect how
much evidence they require before identifying a target as being
previously seen.
Experiment 1b
Method
Participants
Participants were 32 undergraduate students (28 female;M age=
20.91, SD = 5.21) at the University of Calgary who participated
for bonus credit in a Psychology course.
Materials and Procedure
The stimuli and procedure were identical to Experiment 1a
except for the following changes. Stimuli presented in the
encoding task now remained onscreen for 3000 ms. This change
wasmade in response to participant feedback that the longer 5000
ms encoding time Experiment 1a led to difficulty concentrating
toward the end of the experiment. In addition, participants were
tested in our laboratory, and made their responses via button
press on a response box. Button assignment was counterbalanced
across participants. Finally, the list of verbs that was used as old
or new items (i.e., which of the lists constituted the studied items
and which constituted the lures) was counterbalanced across
participants.
Results
Paired-samples t-tests indicated that hit rate was again
significantly higher for high embodiment verbs (M= 75.03, SD=
10.24) than for low embodiment verbs (M = 69.56, SD = 12.59),
t(31) = 2.93, p = 0.006, Cohen’s d = 0.53 (see Figure 1B). There
was no significant difference between high and low embodiment
verbs in false alarm rates, t(31)= 0.91, p= 0.37. However, d’ scores
were significantly larger for high embodiment verbs (M = 1.33,
SD = 0.51) than for low embodiment verbs (M = 1.12, SD =
0.52), t(31) = 3.00, p= 0.005, Cohen’s d= 0.53. Finally, there was
no significant difference between these verbs in terms of response
criterion C, t(31) = 1.26, p= 0.22. See Table 2.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1b provide evidence of more accurate
recognition memory for high embodiment verbs, in the form of a
higher hit rate and d’ for these items. Again, this may indicate that
high embodiment verbs enjoy more elaborative encoding than
low embodiment verbs.
EXPERIMENT 2
Having found a memory benefit for high embodiment verbs, we
further explored this phenomenon by examining the potential
for interaction with the imagined enactment effect. While the
enactment effect is well-documented, previous studies have not
taken into account the amount of motor information that to be
remembered actions elicit. We investigated whether instructions
to simulate the actions might erase the benefit for high
embodiment verbs. That is, encouraging the simulation of actions
might nullify the relative difference in automatic simulation
elicited by high and low embodiment verbs. Another possibility
is that the advantage provided by instructing participants
to simulate actions might be especially beneficial for high
embodiment verbs, because of the greater amount of associated
motor information that one could evoke. These results (i.e.,
an interaction) would suggest that embodiment and imagined
enactment effects have the same underlying source. Conversely,
we may observe separate effects for each that do not interact.
This would suggest that the two effects stem from separate
sources. By examining the interplay between this deliberate
(enactment) simulation and automatic simulation, we hoped
to learn more about both processes. We examined the effects
of imagined enactment on both recognition (Experiment 2a)
and recall memory (Experiment 2b). Although several studies
have demonstrated a larger effect of enactment on recognition
memory (e.g., Mohr et al., 1989), others have found a larger effect
of enactment on recall memory (e.g., Svensson and Nilsson, 1989;
Nilsson and Craik, 1990).
Experiment 2a
Method
Participants
Participants were 44 undergraduate students (20 female;M age=
20.61, SD = 2.66) at the University of Calgary who participated
for bonus credit in a Psychology course.
Materials and Procedure
Stimuli were 120 verbs selected from the embodiment norms
collected by Sidhu et al. (2014). These verbs were separated into
four lists of 30 items, each containing 15 verbs rated high in
relative embodiment (i.e., had a rating> 3.5), and 15 verbs rated
low in relative embodiment (i.e., had a rating< 3.5). Within each
list, verbs high and low in embodiment were again matched in
terms of length, log transformed HAL word frequency, number
of morphemes (Balota et al., 2007), orthographic Levenshtein
distance (Yarkoni et al., 2008), imageability (Chiarello et al.,
1999), and age of acquisition (Kuperman et al., 2012); they did,
however, differ in terms of their rated embodiment (Sidhu et al.,
2014), see Table 3 Across lists, high and low embodiment verbs
were also matched on all of these variables. Of the four lists,
two pairs were yoked such that they appeared together as either
studied items or lures. See Appendix B for a full list of verb
stimuli.
During the study phase, participants were shown verbs one
at a time, in two blocks that differed in their instructions. These
instructions were presented as strategies to help participants
remember the verbs for an upcoming memory test. In one block
participants were asked to imagine themselves performing the
action described, in particular how it would feel. In this block
verbs were shown in a second person, present tense phrase (e.g.,
You are running). In the other block, participants were asked
to imagine seeing someone else perform the action described
as though watching a film. In this block verbs were shown in
a first person, present tense phrase (e.g., I am running). These
pronouns were based on those used by Ditman et al. (2010)
to elicit either simulations of the reader performing an action
(i.e., second person phrases) or watching another performing an
action (i.e., first person phrases). In contrast to typical studies
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TABLE 3 | Mean values (standard deviations in parentheses) of lexical and semantic variables for high and low embodiment verbs, Experiments 2a–3b.
High embodiment verbs Low embodiment verbs t p Cohen’s d
Length 5.73 (1.04) 5.88 (0.99) 0.81 0.42 0.15
Log HAL frequency 7.79 (1.49) 8.10 (1.45) 1.19 0.24 0.21
Number of morphemes 1.45 (0.50) 1.43 (0.50) 0.18 0.86 0.04
OLD 1.98 (0.34) 2.02 (0.34) 0.65 0.52 0.12
Imageability 407.35 (59.30) 391.73 (62.81) 1.40 0.16 0.26
AoA 8.77 (1.97) 9.18 (1.92) 1.15 0.25 0.21
Embodiment 4.34 (0.44) 2.78 (0.26) 23.57 <0.001 4.46
OLD, Orthographic Levenshtein distance; AoA, Age of Acquisition.
on the enactment effect, we only presented participants with
verbs as opposed to verb-noun phrases because our interest was
specifically in the effects of rated embodiment of each verb. Each
block contained one of the four lists of verbs (i.e., each block
contained 15 high embodiment verbs and 15 low embodiment
verbs). Block order was counterbalanced across participants, as
was the assignment of list to block type. Each trial began with
a fixation cross that remained onscreen for 500 ms. This was
replaced by the phrase, which remained onscreen for 3000 ms.
Finally, the phrase was replaced by a 1000 ms blank screen before
advancing to the next trial.
Following completion of the study phase, participants were
asked to solve as many multiplication problems as they could in
5 min, after which they took part in a recognition test. During
the test phase, participants saw both of the 30-item lists of verbs
that they had studied earlier, as well as the two lists of 30 verbs
that they had not studied, intermixed in a random order. Verbs
were presented one at a time, on their own, in their infinitive form
(e.g., running). Participants indicated whether the verb was old
or new via button press on a response box. Button assignment
was counterbalanced across participants, as was the assignment
of lists as studied items or lures.
Results
Except for the analysis of false alarms, we used within subjects
two-factor ANOVAs to examine if memory performance was
affected by verb embodiment (high vs. low) and imagined
enactment condition (imagine moving vs. imagine watching).
Because enactment was not manipulated for false alarms (i.e., at
test lures could not vary in enactment), those data were analyzed
using a paired-samples t-test. In addition, when calculating d’
score and criterion C, hit rates were compared to the false
alarm rate for either high or low embodiment verbs, but
could not be compared to false alarms at the same level of
enactment.
Results indicated a main effect of embodiment on hit rate,
F(1, 43) = 6.16, p= 0.02, η
2 = 0.02; hit rate was again significantly
higher for high embodiment verbs (M = 72.80, SD= 19.90) than
for low embodiment verbs (M = 69.54, SD = 19.17). There was
no main effect of imagined enactment on hit rate, F(1, 43) = 0.32,
p = 0.57; nor was there an interaction between embodiment and
imagined enactment, F(1, 43) = 0.66, p = 0.42 (see Figure 2A).
There was no difference between high and low embodiment
verbs in false alarm rates, t(43) = 1.24, p = 0.22. Analysis of d’
scores showed no main effects of either embodiment, F(1, 43) =
0.43; or imagined enactment, F(1, 43) = 0.40, p = 0.53; nor an
interaction, F(1, 43) = 2.30, p = 0.14. Lastly, results indicated
a main effect of embodiment on criterion C, F(1, 43) = 5.20,
p = 0.03, η2 = 0.04; criterion C was significantly lower for
high embodiment verbs (M = −0.14, SD = 0.52) than for low
embodiment verbs (M = 0.07, SD = 0.38). There was no main
effect of imagined enactment on criterion C, F(1, 43) = 0.40,
p = 0.53; nor was there an interaction between embodiment
and imagined enactment, F(1, 43) = 2.30, p = 0.14. See
Table 4.
Discussion
As in the previous experiments, we observed a higher hit rate for
high embodiment verbs as compared to low embodiment
verbs. Notably, this persisted here despite instructions
for participants to imagine themself or another person
performing each action. We also observed that participants
set a lower response criterion for these high embodiment
items. However, there was no main effect of imagined
enactment on any of these memory measures, nor was
there any evidence that imagined enactment interacted with
embodiment.
Experiment 2b
Method
Participants
Participants were 45 undergraduate students (35 female;M age=
23.42, SD = 9.40) at the University of Calgary who participated
for bonus credit in a Psychology course.
Materials and Procedure
The stimuli and procedure were identical to Experiment 2a,
except that participants now took part in a recall test as opposed
to a recognition test. On the recall test, they were asked to recall
as many verbs as they could in 3 min.
Results
Intrusions were defined as recalled items not present on a
participant’s study list, or studied items that had been previously
recalled by a participant (i.e., the same item recalled more than
once). These made up an average of 28.64% (SD = 24.15) of
items recalled by participants and were excluded from analyses.
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FIGURE 2 | Mean percentage of high and low embodiment items, encoded in the imagine moving or imagine watching blocks, that were correctly
identified as old (i.e., hits), in Experiment 2a (A), or correctly recalled in Experiment 2b (B). Error bars represent 95% CIs using the Cousineau (2005)
correction.
TABLE 4 | Mean scores (standard deviations in parentheses) on memory measures for high and low embodiment verbs, encoded in the imagine moving
or imagine watching blocks, in Experiments 2a and 2b.
Memory measure Imagine moving Imagine watching
High embodiment verbs Low embodiment verbs High embodiment verbs Low embodiment verbs
EXPERIMENT 2A
% Hits 72.87 (22.83) 70.90 (21.51) 72.72 (16.99) 68.18 (16.82)
% FAs 34.32 (23.51)a 32.81 (24.18)a
d’ Score 1.27 (1.58) 1.32 (1.53) 1.31 (1.27) 1.12 (1.13)
Criterion C −0.13 (0.50) −0.07 (0.50) −0.15 (0.54) 0.03 (0.47)
EXPERIMENT 2B
% Recalled 15.56 (9.43) 13.33 (10.92) 13.63 (10.73) 10.81 (9.02)
aFalse alarm rates refer to new high and low embodiment items as a whole, as new items could not vary in terms of imagined enactment.
We used within-subjects two-factor ANOVAs to examine if
correct memory performance was affected by verb embodiment
(high vs. low) and imagined enactment condition (imagine
moving vs. imagine watching). Results indicated a main effect
of embodiment on recall accuracy, F(1, 44) = 5.04, p = 0.03
η
2 = 0.03; a larger percentage of the high embodiment verbs
were correctly recalled (M = 14.59, SD = 7.73) as compared
to the low embodiment verbs (M = 12.07, SD = 7.56). There
was no main effect of imagined enactment, F(1, 44) = 2.19, p
= 0.15; nor was there an interaction between embodiment and
imagined enactment, F(1, 44) = 0.06, p= 0.81 (see Figure 2B). See
Table 4.
Discussion
We observed higher recall accuracy for high embodiment
verbs, suggesting that the memory benefit observed for these
items on recognition memory also extends to recall memory.
However, once again, we did not observe an effect of imagined
enactment, nor an interaction between imagined enactment and
embodiment.
EXPERIMENT 3
In order to try and make the imagined enactment manipulation
more salient, we next modified the phrases in the imagine
watching condition, using a third person as opposed to first
person pronoun (Experiment 3a). Although Ditman et al. (2010)
observed a larger effect for first person than third person
phrases (relative to second person phrases), recall that those
phrases were embedded in longer scenarios. It seemed possible
that when presented in isolation, the first person phrases
may have been confusing for participants, and perhaps led
them to imagine themselves performing the actions in both
conditions.
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We further modified the imagined enactment conditions in
Experiment 3b in order to address the concern that participants
may have inadvertently imagined themselves performing the
actions in the imagine watching condition. It is well-documented
that individuals will simulate themselves performing an
action that they perceive another person performing (e.g.,
Buccino et al., 2001). To circumvent this, and to again
try to make the imagined enactment manipulation more
salient, we instructed participants to imagine an inhuman
robot performing the actions in the imagine watching
condition.
Experiment 3a
Method
Participants
Participants were 48 undergraduate students (45 female;M age=
20.35, SD = 4.53) at the University of Calgary who participated
for bonus credit in a Psychology course.
Materials and Procedure
The stimuli and procedure were identical to Experiment 2b,
except for the block in which participants imagined watching
another person performing the action. Verbs in this block were
now shown in a third person, present tense phrase (e.g.,He/She is
running). Pronoun gender was matched to reported participant
gender.
Results
Intrusions made up an average of 24.18% (SD = 21.70) of items
recalled by participants and were excluded from analyses. Results
again indicated a main effect of embodiment on recall accuracy,
F(1, 47) = 7.89, p = 0.007, η
2 = 0.05; a larger percentage of the
high embodiment verbs were correctly recalled (M= 14.58, SD=
9.01) as compared to the low embodiment verbs (M = 11.04, SD
= 7.18). There was no main effect of imagined enactment, F(1, 47)
= 1.59, p= 0.21; nor was there an interaction of embodiment and
imagined enactment, F(1, 47) = 0.05, p= 0.82 (see Figure 3A).
Discussion
Once again, we observed a benefit for high embodiment verbs
on recall memory, but no effect of imagined enactment, nor an
interaction with embodiment.
Experiment 3b
Method
Participants
Participants were 48 undergraduate students (42 female;M age=
20.63, SD = 3.85) at the University of Calgary who participated
for bonus credit in a Psychology course.
Materials and Procedure
The stimuli and procedure were identical to those in Experiment
3a, except for the block in which participants imagined watching
another person performing the action. Participants were now
asked to imagine watching a non-human robot performing the
action, in particular R2-D21 from the Star Wars movie franchise
1The authors are aware that R2-D2 is in fact a droid (Sansweet, 1998), but will refer
to him as a robot for the benefit of readers not familiar with the term droid.
(see Appendix C for verbatim instructions). The instructions for
this block were presented with an image of R2-D2; verbs in this
block were shown in a third person, present tense phrase (e.g.,
R2-D2 is running).
Results
Intrusions made up an average of 31.13% (SD = 25.04) of
items recalled by participants and were excluded from analyses.
Results again indicated a main effect of embodiment on recall
accuracy, F(1, 47) = 7.51, p= 0.009, η
2 = 0.03; a larger percentage
of the high embodiment verbs were correctly recalled (M =
14.38, SD = 7.47) as compared to the low embodiment verbs
(M = 11.60, SD = 7.99). Importantly, there was also a main
effect of imagined enactment, F(1, 47) = 6.59, p = 0.014, η
2
= 0.06; a larger percentage of the verbs encoded during the
imagine moving block were correctly recalled (M = 15.07, SD
= 9.43) as compared to those encoded during the imagine
watching block (M = 10.90, SD = 8.33). There was again
no interaction between embodiment and imagined enactment,
F(1, 47) = 0.01, p= 0.91 (see Figure 3B; Table 5). We investigated
the degree of evidence supporting this lack of an interaction
using a Bayesian approach, and calculated the relative posterior
probabilities of the null and alternate hypotheses (Masson,
2011). This revealed positive evidence (Raftery, 1995) that the
interaction was not likely to exist, pBIC(H0|D)= 0.92; pBIC(H1|D)
= 0.08.
Discussion
Consistent with the previous experiments, we observed a
memory benefit for high embodiment verbs. For the first
time, we also observed an imagined enactment effect such
that participants had higher recall accuracy for verbs encoded
in the imagine moving condition as opposed to the imagine
watching (R2D2) condition. There was no interaction between
factors, suggesting that these effects may rely on distinct
processes.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
A central proposal of embodied cognition is that sensorimotor
information is involved in simulation, and that it plays an
important role in language processing (Barsalou, 1999, 2008). As
such, there may be language processing differences for words that
elicit varying amounts of simulation. These differences would be
consistent with the semantic richness literature, in which words
with a greater amount of associated information enjoy processing
benefits on a variety of lexical tasks (e.g., Pexman et al., 2008).
Sidhu et al. (2014) examined body-based semantic richness in the
context of verbs that varied in the extent to which they involved
the human body (i.e., their relative embodiment) and found that
high embodiment verbs were processed faster in several tasks.
This was ostensibly due to the greater amount of sensorimotor
simulation and thus semantic activation for these words. Here
we sought to examine the effects of variation in simulation on
memory.
In Experiments 1a-2a participants studied high and low
embodiment verbs and then had their recognition memory
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FIGURE 3 | Mean percentage of high and low embodiment items, encoded in the imagine moving or imagine watching blocks, that were correctly
recalled in Experiment 3a (A) or 3b (B). Error bars represent 95% CIs using the Cousineau (2005) correction.
TABLE 5 | Mean scores (standard deviations in parentheses) on memory measures for high and low embodiment verbs, encoded in the imagine moving
or imagine watching blocks, in Experiments 3a and 3b.
Memory measure Imagine moving Imagine watching
High embodiment verbs Low embodiment verbs High embodiment verbs Low embodiment verbs
EXPERIMENT 3A
% Recalled 15.56 (11.53) 11.67 (9.58) 13.61 (11.34) 10.42 (9.91)
EXPERIMENT 3B
% Recalled 16.53 (11.59) 13.61 (11.08) 12.22 (9.85) 9.58 (9.32)
tested. Hit rate was consistently higher for high as compared
to low embodiment verbs. Experiments 2b-3b employed a recall
test and results showed that participants also had higher recall
accuracy for high embodiment verbs. These results are consistent
with the proposal that items with a greater amount of associated
bodily information enjoy more elaborate encoding, potentially
due to a greater amount of evoked simulation. This more
elaborate encoding then leads to a strongermemory trace for high
embodiment items and facilitates memory performance. Thus,
these results fit with previous results showing that item level
variation can lead to differences in elaboration and memory (e.g.,
Hargreaves et al., 2012). It is possible that simulation may play
a role in some of these effects, such as the memory benefit for
animate over inanimate nouns (Bonin et al., 2014; the authors
themselves mention this possibility), or for concrete over abstract
words (e.g., Hamilton and Rajaram, 2001).
Interestingly, we found no effect of embodiment on false
recognition of new items (i.e., no difference in false alarm rate).
This result differs from that of Montefinese et al. (2013) who
found a higher false alarm rate for manipulatory verbs. They
speculated that this was due to these items sharing a category
with previously seen manipulatory verbs, based on their shared
motor information (i.e., all movements performed with the
hands). However, in our experiments the high embodiment verbs
did not share specific motor information, but rather shared a
greater amount of embodiment in general. This would suggest
that the higher false alarm rate observed by Montefinese et al.
was indeed due to the overlapping motor information among
manipulatory items, and that this is not a necessary outcome
for high embodiment items. This is somewhat surprising given
studies on motor fluency and false recognition (e.g., Yang
et al., 2009). Yang et al. found that participants were more
likely to falsely recognize letter dyads if they could be typed
with a single hand. They interpreted this as being due to
more fluent simulation for these items. With this in mind,
we might have expected high embodiment items to be falsely
recognized as old more often, due to the fact that it is easier
to simulate the actions to which they refer. The fact that we
did not observe an effect in false recognition suggests that
different processes are likely involved for letter dyad recognition
(the Yang et al. study) and word recognition (the present
study).
Another interesting result was that in the present Experiments
1a and 2a (but not Experiment 1b), participants set a
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significantly lower response criterion for high embodiment
verbs. One interpretation is that participants required less
evidence of having previously seen high embodiment verbs
before categorizing them as old; low embodiment verbs required
more evidence. Previous research suggests that participants
may be able to shift their response criterion on a trial-by-trial
basis, however, this process seems to occur over several trials
(e.g., Brown and Steyvers, 2005). The results presented here
could suggest that participants set a lower response criterion
on trials that elicit a greater amount of simulation. This
possibility should be examined more systematically in future
research.
The other aim of this paper was to examine the interplay
between automatic simulation and the more deliberate
simulation evoked in the imagined enactment effect. In
particular, we examined whether their effects on memory
have the same or different sources. An imagined enactment
effect proved difficult to observe, only appearing in one of
four experiments. A potentially important difference between
the present study and previous studies on the enactment
effect is that participants in the present study only studied
phrases containing actions as opposed to actions and nouns.
In fact, some theorists point to a facilitated integration
between actions and nouns as being responsible for the
enactment effect (Kormi-Nouri, 1995). Another important
difference between the present study and the one conducted
by Ditman et al. (2010) is that in the latter, action phrases
were embedded in larger scenarios. Thus, our results may
suggest that imagined enactment effects are less robust
when target items are presented in isolation. As to why an
imagined enactment effect did emerge in Experiment 3b, our
interpretation has to do with the actor being visualized in
that imagine watching condition (i.e., an inhuman robot vs.
a person). Perhaps it is difficult to avoid evoking some motor
information when imagining another person performing an
action, but it is less difficult to avoid this when imagining an
inhuman robot performing an action. This combined with the
previously mentioned differences may have made the imagined
enactment manipulation too subtle to generate an effect in
Experiments 2a-3a. It may also be worth noting that in the
study conducted by Ditman et al. (2010), participants were not
explicitly told to imagine performing or watching the actions
described.
The most important finding from Experiment 3b was that
when we did observe an imagined enactment effect, it did not
interact with verb embodiment. On the contrary, these two
factors appeared to have separate effects. Thus, it would be
consistent with additive-factors logic to conclude that these two
factors affected separate stages in processing (Sternberg, 1969).
The effects of embodiment on memory have been assumed
to result from differences between items in the automatic
simulation ofmotor information (e.g., Madan and Singhal, 2012).
Conversely, purposefully imagining the performance of an action
likely involves a more deliberate process of simulation. It seems
likely that the effects of these two processes on memory are
distinct.
It is worth revisiting the results of Madan and Singhal
(2012) who did not find a benefit for highly manipulable items
when participants made responses based on the manipulability
of items; in fact, under those conditions participants showed
a memory benefit for non-manipulable items. The authors
theorized that the deliberate process of responding to the
manipulability question may have overridden the automatic
memory enhancing effect of highly manipulable items, and thus
allowed for task demands to play a role (e.g., making non-
manipulable items stand out by virtue of their incongruence
with the decision criterion). While these results are somewhat
different than those observed in the present Experiment 3b,
they point to a similar conclusion: automatic and deliberate
simulation can have different effects.
Broadly, the memory benefit we observed for high
embodiment verbs is consistent with the notion that these
items elicited a greater amount of automatic simulation. Greater
simulation likely led to more elaborate encoding for high
embodiment items. Thus, while other contributions to the
second edition of the Meaning in mind: Semantic richness effects
in language processing Research Topic have demonstrated an
advantage for semantically rich words on lexical processing
tasks (e.g., Johns et al., 2016; Sidhu et al., 2016), the present
results show that item level variation in semantic richness can
also result in an advantage for memory. That is, our findings
suggest that differences in the amount of simulation evoked can
have effects beyond lexical processing tasks (e.g., Siakaluk et al.,
2008; Sidhu et al., 2014), with implications for memory as well.
While item-specific semantic richness effects in memory tasks
have been reported in previous studies for noun stimuli (e.g.,
Hargreaves et al., 2012, in the first edition of the Meaning in
mind Research Topic), those effects are extended here to verb
stimuli. As such, our findings point to the generality of semantic
richness effects, across paradigms and word classes.
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APPENDIX A
HIGH EMBODIMENT VERBS IN EXPERIMENTS 1A
AND 1B
Abuse Descend Meditate
Adapt Detain Molest
Align Emerge Nurture
Announce Endure Obstruct
Annoy Evade Pave
Arrange Evolve Pillage
Ascend Excite Pour
Assist Exist Produce
Attach Expel Pry
Attend Expire Punish
Beckon Extend Pursue
Bring Flatten Put
Build Gather Raise
Buy Hasten React
Cheat Hinder Recite
Communicate Hiss Relieve
Congregate Hustle Resist
Cram Impair Revive
Defend Join Roam
Depart Learn Sever
Deprive Linger Shut
Stalk Suffer Vacate
Steal Swear
Stop Teach
LOW EMBODIMENT VERBS IN EXPERIMENTS 1A
AND 1B
Absorb Conduct Excel
Accept Confirm Fade
Add Deceive Flourish
Adopt Despise Ignite
Adore Detest Insist
Aspire Devote Invent
Banish Differ Keep
Begin Dilute Lend
Believe Divert Lie
Belong Divide Melt
Betray Dwell Obey
Bless Earn Oppose
Borrow Embark Owe
Brighten Enable Promote
Cancel Engage Reflect
Choose Enrich Refrain
Commend Evaluate Regain
Comply Evaporate Reject
Condemn Exceed Renew
Repay Sift Unify
Resolve Simmer Wallow
Restore Solve Zoom
Revise Spend
Save Sweeten
APPENDIX B
HIGH EMBODIMENT VERBS IN
EXPERIMENTS 2A–3B
Adapting Evading Pillaging
Aligning Evolving Pouring
Announcing Exciting Producing
Annoying Existing Prying
Arranging Expelling Punishing
Ascending Expiring Pursuing
Assisting Extending Raising
Attaching Flattening Reacting
Attending Gathering Reciting
Beckoning Hastening Relieving
Building Hindering Resisting
Cheating Hissing Reviving
Cramming Hustling Roaming
Defending Impairing Severing
Departing Joining Stalking
Depriving Lingering Stealing
Descending Meditating Suffering
Detaining Nurturing Swearing
Emerging Obstructing Teaching
Enduring Paving Vacating
LOW EMBODIMENT VERBS IN
EXPERIMENTS 2A–3B
Absorbing Deceiving Lending
Accepting Despising Opposing
Adding Detesting Promoting
Adopting Devoting Reflecting
Adoring Differing Refraining
Aspiring Diluting Regaining
Banishing Diverting Rejecting
Beginning Dividing Renewing
Belonging Dwelling Repaying
Betraying Earning Resolving
Blessing Embarking Restoring
Borrowing Enabling Revising
Brightening Engaging Sifting
Cancelling Enriching Simmering
Choosing Exceeding Solving
Commending Fading Spending
Complying Flourishing Sweetening
Condemning Igniting Unifying
Conducting Insisting Wallowing
Confirming Inventing Zooming
APPENDIX C
Instructions for the Imagine Watching Condition in Experiment
3b. You will now see phrases describing actions performed by
R2-D2 (pictured above). For each phrase, it’s important that you
imagine seeing R2-D2 performing the activity described. Imagine
watching the activity as if it were in a video. Let the experimenter
know if you have any questions. If not, press any button to begin.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 13 June 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1010
